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On the verge of crisis? 
Mounting economic problems in Belarus
Kamil Kłysiński
Belarus’s financial condition has visibly worsened since the beginning of 
this year. The severe falls in the country’s foreign currency reserves and its 
shortage of foreign currency on the international market pose an increasing 
threat to the stability of the Belarusian economy. Fearing an outbreak of 
public dissatisfaction, The government has so far been trying to avoid de-
valuing the rouble or structural economic reforms. Maintaining full control 
inside the country and the stability of the authoritarian regime are still 
the main concerns for President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. For this reason, 
the actions taken by the Belarusian government have been limited to impo-
sing short-term administrative restrictions on the foreign currency market 
and obtaining external support in the form of loans. Given Belarus’s falling 
creditworthiness, Minsk is only able to ask Russia for financial support, 
thus offering the Kremlin more opportunities to realise its desire to take 
over strategic industrial plants in Belarus. However, the present economic 
problems of Belarus are so serious that no loan will be able to safeguard its 
government from the need of carrying out serious economic reforms.
The special features of the Belarusian economic model
Belarus’s economy is based on the command-and-distribution governance model inherited 
from the Soviet period. This involves management by means of the central planning of 
exports, imports, investments, production modernisation, etc. As a result, the Belarusian 
economy is particularly inflexible and inefficient in comparison to the neighbouring coun-
tries’ economies, where free-market rules apply (albeit to various extents). At the same 
time, since a significant part of its industry is export-oriented, it is very vulnerable to the 
changing situation on the global market. The operation of the Belarusian economic model 
has long been based on Russian cheap energy and trade subsidies. Thanks to lower oil and 
gas prices, Belarus was able to generate significant revenues (for example, from exports of 
 oil products (mainly to the EU and the USA), which enabled it to support the inefficient 
branches of its economy and finance its extensive social welfare system. Moreover, access 
to the Russian market on preferential conditions guaranteed many Belarusian firms, espe-
cially in the machine-building and food sectors, high level of exports for their goods (which 
would be rather uncompetitive on Western markets). Thus the industrial production rose 
continually and leveraged high economic growth, which ranged between 7 and 9 percent 
over the past decade. 
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The causes of Belarus’s economic problems 
In an attempt to force the Belarusian government to make concessions (including selling its 
strategic petrochemical, machine-building, metallurgical and food plants), Russia has been 
gradually reducing these preferences since 2007. The rise in Russian oil and gas prices 
caused a significant increase in the costs of operation for the unreformed and energy- 
-consuming Belarusian economy and a worsening of its trade balance, which had already 
been negative. The trade deficit (in the exchange of goods) reached US$9.6 billion (inc-
luding US$8.3 billion with its main trade partner, Russia). This is the highest deficit level 
in the history of independent Belarus. The total value of trade turnover reached approxima-
tely US$60 billion. A good illustration of the negative economic trends is the condition of 
the Belarusian petrochemical sector, which is one of the country’s main sources of budget 
revenue (around 10 percent in preceding years). Belarusian refineries were barely able to 
remain profitable in 2010; and since new, even less favourable conditions for Russian oil 
supply and processing were introduced at the beginning of this year, the Belarusian petro-
chemical industry has fallen into the red, and is now generating losses. Another factor which 
has significantly contributed to the worsening of the economic situation in Belarus is the fall 
in demand for and prices of the key Belarusian exports (oil products, artificial fertilisers and 
metallurgical products) on Western and non-European markets due to the global crisis. 
As a result, the demand for foreign curren-
cy increased among entrepreneurs at the 
end of last year, due to the growing costs 
of their foreign debt service and the higher 
costs of importing raw materials and equ-
ipment. The demand for foreign currency 
also increased among Belarusian citizens, 
who were expecting a devaluation of the 
rouble. Thus the Belarusian central bank 
was forced to make frequent interventions 
on the foreign currency market in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate for the rouble. 
An additional burden on the state’s finances resulted from rises in public sector wages 
(the average wage was increased from approximately US$370 in the middle of 2010 to 
approximately US$500 at the end of 2010), which the government made before the pre-
sidential elections last December. As a result, the Belarusian gold and foreign currency 
reserves in 2010 fell to as low as 9.5 percent of GDP, which was the worst result among 
all countries in this region (for comparison, it reached 32 percent in Russia and 25 percent 
in Ukraine). 
Paradoxically, despite these processes, Belarus maintained a high level of GDP growth, 
which reached up to 7.6 percent (the result for the first two months of this year is similar). 
This surprisingly good result is to a great extent artificially inflated by the centrally planned 
industrial production, which is carried out regardless of current demand for given goods; 
in connection with this, a significant part of goods from Belarusian manufacturers (especially 
in the textile and machine-building sectors) end up being stored in warehouses. 
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The rise in Russian oil and gas prices 
caused a significant increase 
in the costs of operation for 
the unreformed and energy-consuming 
Belarusian economy and a worsening 
of its trade balance, 
which hadalready been negative.
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The worsening of the state finances in 2011
The dynamics of the negative processes in the area of state finance have clearly increased sin-
ce the beginning of 2011. The central bank’s foreign currency reserves fell by approximately 
US$1 billion (20 percent) in January-February alone, and on 1 March were as low as approxi-
mately US$4 billion, which was far below the equivalent of three-month imports, the amount 
necessary to maintain financial stability (estimated to reach approximately US$9 billion). 
This decrease took place despite the Belarusian government’s issue of Eurobonds worth 
US$800 million this January and the frequent borrowing of foreign currency in exchange for 
the rouble equivalent by the central bank from commercial banks. The value of funds thus ob-
tained over the past year increased by fifty times, to US$4 billion, and now the central bank’s 
debt to other banks is higher than the level of its foreign currency reserves. 
At the same time, Belarus’s foreign debt has risen significantly. According to official data, on 
1 January 2011 its foreign debt exceeded US$28 billion (approximately 52 percent of GDP), 
which means an increase of almost 30 percent compared to the beginning of 2010. Although 
the country’s foreign debt reached only 21 percent [of GDP], its remaining part is de facto 
generated by state-owned companies and therefore needs to be treated comprehensively. 
It is worth noting that Belarus will have to repay as much as US$8 billion to its creditors 
within the next five years, and the repayment peak is expected in 2013–2014. Servicing the 
foreign debt alone generates high costs, estimated to reach US$695 million this year alone. 
The trade balance deficit is also deepening. 
According to the latest data, the negati-
ve balance in January-February 2011 re-
ached US$1.96 billion, while at the same 
time last year it stood at US$468 million. 
Inflation is also growing at an alarming 
rate. In the first two months of this year, 
it grew by 4.2 percent, half the rate which 
this year’s budget provides for. Prices of 
goods in Belarus increased more in this 
period than was the case, for example, 
in Lithuania, Ukraine or Russia. 
At the same time, the general public is increasingly distrustful of the Belarusian rouble, and 
demand for foreign currency is rising.At present it is quite difficult to buy foreign currency in 
Belarus. More and more reports are also received of further restrictions aimed at inhibiting 
demand for foreign currency among individual buyers. The shortage of foreign currency has 
also forced some Belarusian firms to limit their operations. In response to the mounting pro-
blems in the Belarusian economy, the international agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
lowered Belarus’s credit ratings this March, which will adversely affect its creditworthiness 
on international financial markets. 
OSW.WAW.PL
Belarus’s foreign debt has risen signifi-
cantly. According to official data, 
on 1 January 2011 its foreign debt 
exceeded US$28 billion (approximately 
52 percent of GDP). It is worth noting 
that Belarus will have to repay as much 
as US$8 billion to its creditors within 
the next five years, and the repayment 
peak is expected in 2013–2014.
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Measures taken by the government to improve the situation
As a consequence of the worsening condition of the state finances, the Belarusian govern-
ment has applied instruments typical of the command-and-distribution model. A number of 
restrictions have been imposed on the pur-
chase of foreign currency by business enti-
ties, which have been most responsible for 
the pressure of demand on the currency 
market. For example, a ban was imposed 
on importers purchasing foreign currency 
from the market in the case of transactions 
exceeding €50,000. An obligation to report 
the intention to buy foreign currency on the 
Belarusian foreign currency exchange 30 days in advance was also introduced. All those mo-
ves were aimed at stemming the outflow of foreign currency from the internal market, mainly 
by limiting imports, which at the same time was intended to reduce the negative balance 
in trade exchange. 
The government has been acting chaotically and inconsistently. New solutions have been su-
perseded by other administrative regulations after a few days, which has made the situation 
on the financial market even more complicated. Over the past few weeks, the Belarusian go-
vernment has trying to calm public sentiment by ensuring that the situation is under control. 
At the same time, the central bank on 28 March agreed to expand the currency fluctuation 
range  to 10 percent on the inter-bank market, which can be seen as a preliminary sign 
that the government has indirectly accepted the gradual devaluation of the Belarusian rouble. 
Furthermore, to stabilise the situation, on 31 March the central bank decided to suspend any 
new regulations on the foreign currency market for one month. At present, the Belarusian 
government is pinning its hopes on obtaining a loan of US$1 billion from Russia and a loan 
of approximately US$2 billion from the 
Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC). These funds will be 
allocated to supplementing the evaporating 
foreign currency reserves. 
At the same time, the government has di-
sregarded suggestions which experts from 
the International Monetary Fund have been 
making over the past few months, and avo-
ided any radical moves to reduce budget 
spending, for one possible measure. The Belarusian regime fears that any tough economic 
decisions could give rise to public dissatisfaction, and thus undermine the system’s stability. 
However, it seems that under the pressure of the mounting problems, Minsk is becoming in-
creasingly aware of how serious the situation is. On 31 March, Deputy Prime Minister Siarhey 
Rumas announced the imposition of stricter budget discipline, including significant cuts in the 
financing of state investment programmes. At the same time, the government has undertaken 
to submit a plan for macroeconomic reforms to Moscow in the near future, since Russia has 
made its loan decision dependent on that.
However, it seems that under the 
pressure of the mounting problems, 
Minsk is becoming increasingly 
aware of how serious the situation is. 
On 31 March, Deputy Prime Minister 
Siarhey Rumas announced the impo-
sition of stricter budget discipline.
The government has been acting chaoti-
cally and inconsistently. New solutions 
have been superseded by other admi-
nistrative regulations after a few days, 
which has made the situation on the 
financial market even more complicated. 
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The political and economic consequences 
of the mounting economic problems
Belarus’s deteriorating economic situation will have far-reaching political and economic con-
sequences. The government’s restrictions on the financial market have led to the emergence 
of two different foreign currency rates, and the difference between the official rate and 
the market rate is now around as much 
as 25–30 percent. Therefore, it is reaso-
nable to state that the rouble is gradually 
devaluing, contrary to the central bank’s 
assurances. Although this gradual per se 
devaluation may have a positive effect on 
the condition of the Belarusian finances 
over time, this process is now out of the 
central bank’s control, which calls the ef-
fectiveness of the Belarusian government’s policy into question. Foreign debt is also beco-
ming an increasingly serious problem. Although it has not as yet reached a critical level, 
the rate of its growth alone may pose a threat, especially that the funds which will be ob-
tained from the loans will not be allocated to financing reforms, but only to underpinning 
the existing inefficient model. Furthermore, the unfavourable debt structure makes the si-
tuation even worse: most of the loans will have to be repaid within the next three years. 
As a consequence, Belarus finds itself in a debt spiral, and must take more loans to pay off 
the ones it took before. 
The deepening economic problems are not temporary, as the Belarusian government argu-
es, or the effect of a market slump. The present situation results from the specific policy 
pursued by President Lukashenka, whose main priority is to keep and reinforce absolute 
control over all the key areas of the country’s political and economic life. For this reason, 
all other issues, including overcoming the economic crisis, are totally dependent on the 
Belarusian president’s political goals. The Belarusian government, fearing public destabili-
sation, has been maintaining the post-Soviet economic system, which has been possible for 
an extended period thanks to Russian energy and trade subsidies.
The Belarusian economic model, which is now deprived to a large extent of Russian sup-
port, consumes much energy and has an outdated infrastructure, and is no longer able to 
function without thorough reforms. The administrative actions taken by the government 
and a further increase in the foreign debt 
are provisional, and may only stabilise the 
situation for the next few months. Accor-
ding to Belarusian economists’ estima-
tes, the government needs approximately 
US$1 billion monthly to keep the rouble 
exchange rate at the present level, which 
means that Belarus will need an additional 
US$6-7 billion by the end of this year. 
At the same time, the lowered credit ra-
ting will make any new issue of Eurobonds significantly more difficult for Belarus. On the 
other hand, the cooling of relations with the West after the rigged presidential elections 
last December and the repression used against the opposition afterwards have now made 
it impossible for Minsk to seek support from the International Monetary Fund and other in-
ternational financial institutions. Therefore, Minsk may only ask Russia for loans, an oppor-
tunity the Kremlin is likely to use to negotiate more favourable conditions Russian investors 
Minsk may only ask Russia for loans, 
an opportunity the Kremlin is likely 
to use to negotiate more favourable 
conditions Russian investors doing 
business in Belarus, and to take over 
at least some of the strategic assets 
in the Belarusian economy.
The Belarusian economic model, 
which is now deprived to a large 
extent of Russian support, consumes 
much energy and has an outdated 
infrastructure, and is no longer able 
to function without thorough reforms. 
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doing business in Belarus, and to take over at least some of the strategic assets in the Belaru-
sian economy. Aleksei Kudrin, Russia’s deputy prime minister and finance minister, announced 
on 15 March that Russia could respond positively to Minsk’s request for granting two lo-
ans worth US$3 billion in total, on condition that a plan for structural reforms based on 
the IMF’s previous suggestions was presented. It is possible that this reform package will 
also include privatisation of the Minsk vehicle plant MAZ, which the Russian company 
KAMAZ is at present seeking to take over. This means that not even the Russian govern-
ment is not ready to continue supporting Belarus, unless its economic situation becomes 
at least partly more stable, so that Belarus can meet its loan and trade obligations to Russia. 
Forecast
Deprived of other possibilities to obtain funds, Minsk is likely to yieldi to pressure from 
Moscow for the time being. The Belarusian government presented Russia with an action plan 
to stabilise the economy at the beginning of April. 
However, in the longer run, Lukashenka will have to choose between Russian support at 
the expense of increasing dependence on Moscow, and an attempt to resume dialogue and 
co-operation with the West. in exchange for refraining from repression against the opposition. 
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the regime will take actions to improve its relations 
with the EU and the USA in the next few months, and will be exploit the problem of political 
prisoners for this purpose. One preliminary sign of this may be the bringing of milder charges 
against those opposition members who have been in prison since the post-election demon-
stration on 19 December 2010. 
However, regardless of this strategic decision, it seems to be inevitable that Minsk must make 
more radical economic moves (principally the devaluation of the rouble) than hitherto; other-
wise the Belarusian economy may very soon collapse. This move is expected by Belarus’s key 
real and potential creditors, namely Russia and the West. Everything seems to indicate that 
the mounting economic problems are already so serious that they will force Minsk to make 
(at least partial) changes to its previous economic, internal and foreign policies.
